The Strait of Hormuz: From Weak Link to Strategic Advantage — How the UAE Is Redrawing the Global Energy Map

The recent crisis that led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz confirmed the need to rethink supply chain theories with a focus on geographic diversification and sovereign risk management — and the UAE has already recognized this. In this context, the UAE Minister of Foreign Trade, Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi, confirmed that his country “seeks complete independence from Hormuz, whether the strait is open or not.”

This statement is not merely a fleeting reaction to the latest crisis triggered by military and political escalation in the Middle East in late February 2026. It marks a profound strategic shift in the UAE’s philosophy of energy security.

The UAE’s plan rests on three main pillars, the foremost being the expansion of eastern ports located on the coast of the Gulf of Oman outside the Strait of Hormuz: Dibba, Fujairah, and Khor Fakkan. In addition, the country plans to build at least one new port along the same coastline. This is accompanied by massive investments in new pipelines, railway networks, and highways to strengthen links between these ports, oil and gas fields, and refineries.

The Port of Fujairah, whose construction began in 1978 and which became operational in 1983, is now considered one of the world’s largest hubs for crude oil and fuel storage, with capacity of up to 18 million cubic meters and handling about 4,800 vessels per year. The Habshan–Fujairah oil pipeline (ADCOP), with a capacity of 1.5 million barrels per day, played a vital role during the blockade of the strait, allowing the UAE to continue exporting crude oil through its eastern ports. Nevertheless, this is only a small share compared to the roughly 20 million barrels that pass daily through the Strait of Hormuz.

However, the UAE is not stopping there. In mid-May 2026, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed instructed the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) to accelerate the implementation of the new West–East pipeline project, which will double crude export capacity through Fujairah by 2027, bringing the port’s total export capacity to about 3.6 million barrels per day. The country is also considering building a third oil pipeline, as well as options to secure exports of petrochemical products and LNG.

Yet the path to independence involves significant challenges. Problems range from the difficulty of rerouting LNG and aluminum supplies, whose production is concentrated on the Persian Gulf coast, to heavy reliance on ports such as Jebel Ali — the world’s largest container hub outside Asia — for imports. In addition, transporting goods by truck from the eastern ports to major cities such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi will be more expensive. However, Minister Al Zeyoudi believes these costs can be reduced through a substantial expansion of the railway network, and the implementation of these projects is estimated to require tens of billions of dollars.

The UAE’s approach to this system is built on flexibility. This concept has two dimensions: redundancy of routes and system resilience. Redundancy means that the scheme does not depend on a single route; it has several alternative paths. System resilience, by contrast, reduces the sensitivity of each route to disruptions and makes the overall configuration less fragile. The projects the UAE has already implemented and continues to pursue demonstrate the first of these aspects.

Fujairah occupies the position of the most vulnerable link in the new system. In a recent period, drone attacks caused fires and temporarily halted loading operations; parts of the maritime infrastructure were damaged. This episode shows that routes alone are not enough. True flexibility arises only when redundancy and system resilience are combined.

The UAE has built a bypass around the Strait of Hormuz, yet it has not eliminated dependence on this chokepoint. The route serves as a backup in case of disruption: it reduces risk but does not change the geography of supply itself. In a moment of crisis, as Al Zeyoudi put it, “you always recognize your weak points and begin to eliminate them.” That is the logic of the decision: the vulnerability has been named, but it has not disappeared.

The trend extends beyond the UAE. Saudi Arabia is expanding the Petroline (East–West) pipeline to 7 million barrels per day, while Iraq is considering routes through Jordan and Turkey. Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain remain tied to this passage: for them, there is no comparable bypass, and a quickly workable alternative is not yet visible.

The UAE’s course toward “complete independence from Hormuz” changes the logic of energy security in the Persian Gulf region. It is difficult to interpret it merely as a response to the recent war: this is a long-term decision aimed at significantly reducing pressure through vital maritime routes. If the plan succeeds, the UAE will strengthen its own energy security, and the global oil market may face a revision of familiar rules. Fujairah, Dibba, and Khor Fakkan would then assume a new level of importance and become reference points on a new map of ports near Hormuz.

Author: PhD in Economics, Assistant Professor at the Department of World Economy and World Finance, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation Liliya Ganem.