This trend is especially pronounced in the United Kingdom, where yields have surpassed the peaks seen during the panic of 2022 and the brief tenure of Liz Truss’s government, with its mini-budget and unfunded tax cuts for businesses. It seemed those yield peaks would never return. But as inflation revived, central banks responded with a prolonged wave of restrictive monetary policy and high interest rates, which held back price increases. It then seemed the good old days would return: everything would be as it was “under Grandma,” rates would fall back to zero, and new bonds could once again be issued “for free.”
But now, more than five years later, anyone wondering whether those “antediluvian” golden days will return has a firm answer: NO. All else being equal, interest rates and yields are likely to keep rising. The forces behind this increase are fairly obvious: inflation remains stubbornly high and keeps climbing, refusing to fall to the acceptable 2% level, which prevents central banks from cutting rates.
Even Japan, after three decades of deflation, has decided to abandon its cheap-money policy, and the Bank of Japan has raised rates several times. Yet these increases have not had the expected effect, and the Japanese yen continues to fall. Even the combined efforts of the U.S. and Japanese central banks have barely managed to strengthen the yen. In an unprecedented move, they jointly intervened in Japan’s foreign-exchange market, selling euro reserves—a step that shocked the European Central Bank, which had not been notified in advance.
The huge budget deficits of developed countries show no signs of shrinking. This matters because the risk is growing that governments may eventually pressure central banks to use inflation to reduce the real value of national debt.
The geopolitical shocks of recent years, including the war with Iran, are unsettling countries whose economies have grown accustomed to stability. The policies of Kevin Warsh, the new head of the Federal Reserve, offer no support at all; from his very first days in office, he has had to contend with a strong reaction from financial markets.
High bond yields pose a serious problem for highly indebted countries. Every new one-percentage-point increase in debt means rising debt-service payments for Americans, which could amount to several percentage points of GDP over the next ten years.
Yet it is becoming increasingly difficult to imagine a democratic government cutting spending to offset the growing burden of debt in the United States. Each political party is probably hoping that the next administration will inherit the debt crisis.
The 2027 French presidential election could turn into a genuine battle between populist parties on the right and the left. To the dismay of many, President Macron’s centrist party, which lacks a parliamentary majority, is struggling in vain to pass a 2027 budget that includes €54 billion in savings. It is being forced to scale back fiscal stimulus, prompting mass street demonstrations. The longer countries and their governments wait and do nothing to address the situation, the sharper conflicts will become at every level.
Automatically adjusting debt levels by stimulating economic growth—raising growth rates so governments can repay past, present, and future debts—is based on a focus on artificial intelligence and the high productivity it promises. The problem, however, is that investment-led acceleration in economic growth usually generates additional inflation, higher interest rates, and higher bond yields.
At present, market interest rates are rising faster than economic growth. Goldman Sachs estimates that investment in data centers alone will total $1 trillion over the whole of 2026. This reallocation of investment and venture capital is making capital scarcer in the market, which is driving bond yields higher.
However, artificial intelligence may only just be getting ready to make a significant contribution to labor productivity. Even China, where technology seems to be adopted more quickly in manufacturing, appears to face major challenges. In any case, it will clearly take an uncertain amount of time before the long-awaited growth finally begins.
At the same time, electricity is becoming more expensive, and computing power is costly to operate. In the past, computerization and electrification took decades to produce a meaningful increase in labor productivity.
Before modern technology begins to deliver rapid growth, Europe’s fiscal problems may worsen. In that case, artificial intelligence will generate more potential growth in the United States than in the EU, pushing global interest rates higher everywhere. And business opportunities in the Old World will become scarcer, since labor markets are unlikely to improve significantly.
Another problem is that if AI-driven productivity growth is substantial enough to turn fiscal stimulus into greater prosperity, the labor-market problems that gradually accumulate as AI potentially displaces workers will mean that governments have to spend more on unemployment benefits. Ultimately, income will be redistributed from labor to capital as a factor of production. That means higher taxes.
If artificial intelligence triggers a kind of arms race, countries will also be forced to increase spending on national defense.
Rising living standards go hand in hand with longer life expectancy. As a result, government spending on pensions and social protection increases. Economists at the Brookings Institution believe that these factors, combined with higher interest rates, could more than halve the positive effect of AI-driven growth.
The last time the U.S. budget deficit was eliminated was under President Bill Clinton. At the time, the United States achieved faster productivity growth thanks to computers and the early development of the internet. The deficit was eliminated without fiscal discipline, too. The hope that the same trick can be repeated with artificial intelligence may die last, but given the size of the current deficit and national debt, the risks are high and a repeat in the near term is unlikely. After all, you can’t step into the same river twice.
Author: Doctor of Economics, Associate Professor, Professor of the Department of World Economy and International Finance at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Mikhail Vyacheslavovich Zharikov.