Marketplaces or Retail: The New Reality of Digital Commerce

The Federal Antimonopoly Service’s (FAS) position of “neither tightening nor loosening” currently reflects an attempt not to destabilize the already established market configuration. Today, the consumer market is regulated within two different frameworks. Traditional retail has historically been perceived as a торговая сеть with shelf space, a supplier, and a final markup. A marketplace, however, is not merely a store but a digital infrastructure: it connects sellers, buyers, logistics, payments, advertising, pickup points, and sometimes its own financial services.

Therefore, it is impossible to mechanically transfer the old trade rules to platforms. Judging by recent statements, the FAS proceeds from the understanding that additional restrictions on marketplaces may distort competition no less than the complete removal of restrictions on offline chains — this reflects recognition of the complexity of the new market architecture. At the same time, the state is seeking to create a universal model for regulating platform-based trade: the federal law on the platform economy has already been adopted but will enter into force on October 1, 2026, while some of its provisions have already begun to be applied voluntarily by the largest platforms through a memorandum on fair practices.

The key discussion revolves around marketplaces not only because of their scale but primarily because of their different business model. According to data cited by Kommersant (https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8623377), universal marketplaces already account for 81% of orders and 62% of sales volume in Russian online commerce, and according to an Euler forecast, the share of Wildberries and Ozon in 2026 may reach 77% of the total turnover of the online trade industry. This is no longer a niche sales channel but a system-forming infrastructure providing access to consumers. More importantly, a marketplace simultaneously acts as a storefront, rule arbiter, logistics operator, advertising platform, and source of discounts.

In traditional retail, interaction with suppliers was expressed through access to shelf space; on a platform, it is expressed through access to algorithms, product listings, search rankings, reviews, tariffs, logistics, and promotions. Thus, the state is effectively addressing the task of regulating not a separate sales channel but a new digital environment through which an increasing number of sellers gain access to buyers. This requires a cautious approach and gradual adjustment of rules, taking into account the specifics of the digital economy.

The issues that suppliers raise with platforms regarding discounts, commissions, and interaction rules cannot be reduced to a simple confrontation between parties. When a seller depends on one or two platforms, even formally voluntary discounts, commissions, fines, rules for participating in promotions, and changes in tariffs may be perceived as a condition for maintaining sales. In economic terms, this is a classic two-sided market discussion: a platform provides small businesses with access to mass demand while simultaneously gaining the ability to redistribute part of the margin in its favor or in favor of consumers through discount mechanisms. Thus, the supplier gains turnover but loses some independence. This is where the regulatory challenge arises: not to prohibit discounts as such, since they benefit consumers, but to ensure transparency of rules, predictability of commissions, a ban on retroactive worsening of terms, and a clear dispute resolution procedure.

However, active “fine-tuning” of the market may produce the opposite result. If discounts are restricted, certain promotional mechanisms are prohibited, or the tariff model is significantly complicated, part of the costs will almost inevitably be passed on to the final price. This is particularly sensitive amid slowing consumer demand: Kommersant reports that in March 2026, household spending on marketplaces continued to grow in nominal terms, but the growth rate slowed, and in certain non-food categories — furniture, home improvement goods, clothing, and footwear — spending declined.

Moreover, complex regulation often affects not the largest players but medium and small participants. Large platforms have the legal, IT, and financial resources to adapt to new requirements; niche platforms, small sellers, and regional businesses have fewer such resources. As a result, measures intended to protect competition may unintentionally increase market concentration. Therefore, the optimal policy here should not be prohibitive but institutional: transparent contracts, clear commissions, non-discriminatory access to promotion, disclosure of significant rule changes, protection of sellers from sudden fines, and an out-of-court dispute resolution mechanism.

The state now needs to regulate not trade in the classical sense but the digital infrastructure of the consumer market. If marketplaces are treated as ordinary stores, regulation will lag behind and prove ineffective. Conversely, if platforms are left entirely to self-regulation, the risks of supplier dependency and market power concentration will increase.

Thus, the position of “neither tightening nor loosening” can be rational only as a temporary pause: it provides an opportunity to await the practical implementation of the law on the platform economy and assess which problems are resolved through transparency of rules and which require antitrust intervention. Balance is possible here, and it will be built not around the question of “whom to support — retail or marketplaces,” but around a more precise criterion: how to maintain low prices for consumers, market access for small businesses, and competition among the sales channels themselves.

Author: Doctor of Economics, Professor of the Department of World Economy and World Finance at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation Anna Gennadyevna Glebova.